Two Christian Theologies of Depression. by Scrutton, AP
Two Christian Theologies of Depression: An Evaluation and Discussion of Clinical
Implications
Anastasia Philippa Scrutton
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, Volume 22, Number 4, December
2015, pp. 275-289 (Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI:
For additional information about this article
Access provided by University of Leeds (3 Jan 2017 12:48 GMT)
https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2015.0046
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/621234
© 2016 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
Two Christian 
Theologies of 
Depression: 
An Evaluation and 
Discussion of Clinical 
Implications
Anastasia Philippa Scrutton
Keywords: suffering, mystics, pastoral, Dark Night 
of the Soul, Mother Teresa, biomedical, mental illness
There are many Christian theologies of de-pression. Depression is spoken of variously as the result of personal or original sin, as 
a kind of sin (e.g., despair), as a sign of demonic 
possession or as involving demons, as a test of 
faith, as a sign of holiness, or as an occasion for 
spiritual transformation. Although it is difficult to 
draw any absolute distinctions, we might helpfully 
split them into the following three categories for 
the sake of discussion:
(i)   Spiritual illness (SI), in which depression and other 
forms of mental illness are believed to be a kind of 
SI. This includes the ideas that depression is caused 
by sin or demons (or both);
(ii)   Spiritual health (SH), where depression is viewed as 
an indication of (and means to furthering) holiness 
or closeness to God; and
(iii)  Potentially transformative (PT), where depression 
(along with many other instances of suffering1) is 
inherently bad and undesirable, but can become 
the occasion for the person’s spiritual growth (e.g., 
compassion, insight, appreciation of beauty).
Of these three, SI theology is the most famous, 
being so well-known that it is simply dubbed the 
‘Christian belief model’ or the ‘religious explana-
tion’ in some sociology of religion literature (Har-
tog and Gow 2005; Mathews 2008). SI theology 
is still common, particularly in some Evangelical 
and Charismatic communities. As someone on the 
receiving end of this theology describes it:
When dealing with people in the church ... some see 
mental illness as a weakness—a sign you don’t have 
enough faith. They said: ‘It’s a problem of the heart. 
You need to straighten things out with God.’ They make 
depression out to be a sin, because you don’t have the 
joy in your life a Christian is supposed to have. (Jessy 
Grondin, cited Camp 2009)
Because of the prevalence of SI accounts in 
highly vocal Christian communities, such as some 
Evangelical communities, and because of the tes-
timony by depression sufferers of the effect this 
theology has had on them, SI accounts have been 
well-documented by sociologists, pastoral theo-
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logians, and other academics and practitioners. 
However, SH and PT theologies are also worthy 
of attention, because these too are found among 
a number of Christians. Furthermore, philosophi-
cal exploration of these theologies may not only 
challenge existing perceptions of Christian views 
of depression and other forms of mental illness, 
but, in addition, may offer valuable therapeutic 
resources for psychiatric and medical practice.
Overview of This Paper
In this paper, I outline and evaluate SH and PT 
theologies of depression. I argue that, within the 
context of Christian theology, SH theology has 
valuable properties but also some severe problems, 
whereas PT theology maintains the most valu-
able properties of SH theology without sharing 
its pitfalls.
The discussion is relevant to debates about the 
relationship between mystical and pathological 
experiences of mental distress—a debate that has 
important clinical implications about the treat-
ment of service users who interpret their experi-
ences in religious terms. In the second part of the 
paper, I examine some of these clinical implications 
in critical dialogue with Simon Dein and Gloria 
Durà-Vilà’s 2009 article, ‘The Dark Night of the 
Soul: Spiritual Distress and Psychiatric Implica-
tions,’ applying the conclusions of the first part 
of the paper to argue that distinguishing between 
pathological and salutary depression is mistaken 
and dangerous. Although the primary focus of my 
discussion is depression, there is a related debate 
about the pathological status of some religiously 
experienced forms of psychosis (hearing voices, 
seeing visions/hallucinations), and at times ref-
erence are made to these experiences and that 
debate. In my concluding remarks, I reflect on the 
broader theological and philosophical context of 
the PT theology I have advocated.
I am approaching this question as a philoso-
pher of religion, and have an interest not only 
in describing different Christian theologies of 
depression (although I am interested in this), but 
also in evaluating them using philosophical and 
theological criteria. As a result, the article will be 
relevant to two quite distinct groups of people:
(i) people approaching questions to do with religion and 
psychiatry from an etic perspective (i.e., as an out-
sider to the Christian tradition), who wish to know 
what different Christians believe about depression, 
and, perhaps, whether these are therapeutically help-
ful or unhelpful religious beliefs for the Christians to 
hold. This group includes mental health professionals 
who are interested in the religious beliefs of service 
users, and in the implications of religious belief for 
clinical care.
(ii)   People approaching these questions for an emic 
perspective (i.e., from inside the Christian tradi-
tion, or from a tradition or form of spirituality that 
shares some of the same ideas), who are interested 
in the possibilities for making sense of depression 
in religious/spiritual terms, and in which of these 
theologies is to be preferred (and why). This group 
includes theistic philosophers, theologians, and reli-
gious believers who are interested in what it makes 
most sense for them, themselves, to believe.
The fact that the people in group (i) are ap-
proaching the question from an etic (outsider) 
perspective does not entail that they are in fact 
non-Christian or non-religious; they may simply 
have put their own religious commitments to one 
side in their role as mental health professional in 
the interests of professionalism. For this reason, 
it is possible for one person to be both a (i) and 
a (ii) reader (e.g., to adopt an etic perspective in 
their role as a psychiatrist, but an emic perspective 
when approaching the question as a practicing 
Christian).
People who are approaching the question solely 
from (i) may find that some of the things I say 
come across as prescriptive—for instance, because 
I argue that one theology is to be preferred over the 
others, rather than simply describing the theologies 
in turn. That is because theology and philosophy 
are often more explicitly evaluative disciplines 
than, say, sociology or anthropology. However, 
against the charge of being overly prescriptive, it 
should be borne in mind that I am not intending to 
convert non-Christians (or non-religious people) 
to a theological viewpoint. Moreover, I am not 
attempting to address the complex question of 
whether a mental health professional should dis-
suade a religious service user against (what I regard 
as) an unsound and damaging theology (e.g., an 
SI theology) in favor of a more philosophically 
and therapeutically promising one (as I argue, a 
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PT one). Therefore, the paper is not written with 
the intention of convincing mental health profes-
sionals to persuade service users of a particular 
theology if that theology is not something the 
service users believe already—that is a thorny ethi-
cal question that requires separate consideration.
Criteria for Evaluation
On what basis should religious beliefs about 
depression be evaluated? I use several criteria. The 
first relates to the therapeutic value of a belief. 
Therapeutic can mean that the belief promotes the 
cure of the sufferer from mental illness, but it can 
also carry a more general sense of promoting the 
kind of healing that may take place even in the ab-
sence of a cure, which involves the person finding 
meaning and value in their lives, even while their 
suffering is ongoing (see Greider 2007). Including 
‘therapeutic’ as a criterion presupposes that health 
and happiness are good and desirable goals, and 
this is based on a prior commitment to the idea 
that suffering is (in philosophical terms) an evil 
(i.e., undesirable and negative) state of affairs we 
should attempt to lessen or eliminate where pos-
sible (unless the suffering is a means to a good 
end—as in, for example, the case of childbirth).
A second criterion relates to whether the belief 
is realistic or true to experience. In other words, 
is the belief plausible, given what we know about 
the experiences of depression from people who 
have suffered it? Among other things, this involves 
a concern not to romanticize suffering—that is, 
not to impose an idealized view of the experience 
of suffering. The romanticization of extreme suf-
fering takes place from outside the experience 
of extreme suffering2 and, therefore, cannot be 
considered realistic or true to experience.
A third criterion has to do with the logic of 
particular arguments. For example, are the factors 
cited as an argument for a particular position most 
simply and intuitively interpreted as supporting 
that position, or does another explanation appear 
more likely?
Although these criteria and concerns are open 
to debate, none of them is particularly original or 
controversial and it seems unnecessary to preempt 
possible objections to them; I therefore leave justi-
fication of them to future discussions, if necessary, 
in the light of responses to this paper.
SH Theology
What Is SH Theology?
Although many Christians portray mental ill-
ness as a form of SI (e.g., Cutting Edge Ministries 
n.d.; Ballard n.d.; Harcum 2010; Sanders n.d.; 
Smithers n.d.; Stanford 2008; Starkey 2008; Webb 
2012), others see selected cases of (what is called 
by others) mental illness as a form of SH—as 
something that indicates, and furthers, holiness 
and closeness to God. In the context of depression, 
this is found particularly in some Catholic thought, 
drawing on the tradition of the Dark Night of 
the Soul. In this narrative, a period of spiritual 
dryness and sense of abandonment by God is not 
a permanent devastation but part of the journey 
toward union with God. Therefore, feelings of 
depression and abandonment by God, perceived 
diachronically, become a time of crisis that gives 
rise to an opportunity for spiritual transformation, 
and (what superficially appears to be) ‘mental 
illness’ is viewed as ultimately instrumental of 
salvation. This contrasts with a SI theology, be-
cause the sufferer is judged positively rather than 
negatively (their suffering is the result of their 
closeness to God rather than their sin, and so as 
a sign of SH rather than SI).  However, ultimately 
there are also crossovers between the two theolo-
gies: for example, that suffering is pedagogical 
often includes an emphasis on chastisement and/
or purgation which is common to both.
According to SH theology, the spiritual experi-
ence of mental distress (of, say, a saint or other 
spiritual person) is fundamentally distinct from 
mental illness, even though they share some of the 
same manifestations (such as periods of depres-
sion, hearing voices, and having visions). There-
fore, according to SH theology, one can distinguish 
between pathological and spiritual (or ‘salutary’) 
kinds of depression and psychosis—the former is 
mental illness, and the latter is not.
Like SI accounts, SH theology posits a super-
natural etiology: in SI theology, the experience 
is a punishment by God for sin, or the ‘natural’ 
278 ■ PPP / Vol. 22, No. 4 / December 2015
result of sin, or the result of demonic activity; in 
SH theology, God is thought to cause the experi-
ence precisely to show the person’s holiness, bring 
them closer to God, and/or improve them in some 
way. However, whereas SI theology sees mental 
distress as supernatural and negative (caused by 
demons, or sin, or God [but as the result of sin]), 
SH theology sees instances of mental distress as 
supernatural and positive (caused by God, directed 
at the person’s salvation, and as a sign of their 
closeness to God). These distinctions are often 
matters of emphasis rather than absolute differ-
ences (something may be both the result of sin 
and directed at the person’s salvation), yet there 
is a real distinction between the two theologies in 
terms of the way they view the person’s spiritual 
status: on SI theology, the depression sufferer is 
especially far from God, or spiritually ill; on SH 
theology, the depression sufferer is especially close 
to God, or spiritually healthy in comparison with 
other people. Proponents of SH theology often 
identify depression and other instances of what 
other people see as mental illness with the experi-
ences of some of the mystics, and emphasize the 
idea of purgative (i.e., cleansing) suffering intended 
to purify and strengthen the person’s love for God 
(see Poulain 1913).
Examples of SH theology are found in responses 
to the revelation of Mother Teresa of Calcutta’s 
ongoing experience of acute mental distress. Let-
ters to her spiritual advisors, published posthu-
mously, reveal that Mother Teresa experienced 
an intensely painful feeling of God’s absence, 
which began at almost exactly the time she began 
her ministry in Calcutta and, except for a 5-week 
break in 1959, never abated. In her own words:
Now Father—since 49 or 50 this terrible sense of 
loss—this untold darkness—this loneliness this con-
tinual longing for God—which gives me that pain deep 
down in my heart—Darkness is such that I really do not 
see—neither with my mind nor with my reason—the 
place of God in my soul is blank—There is no God in 
me—when the pain of longing is so great—I just long 
& long for God—and then it is that I feel—He does 
not want me—He is not there - … God does not want 
me—Sometimes—I just hear my own heart cry out—
“My God” and nothing else comes—The torture and 
pain I can’t explain. (Mother Teresa, in Kolodiejchuk 
2008, 1–2)
Of the discrepancy between her inner state and 
her public, famously joyful demeanor, she wrote 
that her smile is a ‘mask’ or a ‘cloak’ that ‘covers 
everything’ (Van Biema 2007).
Mother Teresa asked for the letters to be de-
stroyed, but her wish was overruled by the Catho-
lic Church. The Reverend Brian Kolodiejchuk, 
who compiled and edited her letters for publica-
tion, interprets Mother Teresa’s letters in an SH 
way, describing her experiences as a sign of the 
‘spiritual wealth’ of her interior life (Kolodiejchuk 
2008, xii), and published the letters as proof of 
the faith-filled perseverance that he regards as her 
most spiritually heroic act (Van Biema 2007). Simi-
larly, the Reverend Matthew Lamb interprets the 
published letters as an autobiography of spiritual 
ascent, to be ranked alongside Augustine’s Con-
fessions and Thomas Merton’s The Seven Storey 
Mountain (Van Biema 2007). One of her spiritual 
advisors, Archbishop Perier, advised Mother Te-
resa that her agony was a grace granted by God 
and a purification and protection against pride 
after the success of her work (Kolodiejchuk 2008, 
167). For these men, Mother Teresa’s ongoing 
mental distress is regarded as being caused by God 
as an indication of her close relationship with God, 
and as something that increased her holiness and/
or spiritual heroism. Through the spiritual direc-
tion of Perier and others, Mother Teresa began 
to see her experiences in terms of something that 
would both ‘please Jesus’ and bring others to him 
(Mother Teresa, cited Kolodiejchuk 2008, 173; 
see Kolodiejchuk 2008, 168). The emphasis on 
purification and protection against pride highlights 
both the similarity and difference between an SH 
theology and a SI one. They are similar in that the 
suffering has a chastising function in cleansing the 
person from sin and so is, in some sense, the result 
of sin (the person would not need to suffer if no 
element of sin remained in them). They are differ-
ent in that, for SH theology, the chastisement for 
sin is an indication of their extraordinary spiritual 
status (their holiness and closeness to God) rather 
than the reverse—the result of their sin or a sign 
that they have not been saved.
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Evaluation of SH Theology
An advantage of SH theology is that it can help 
sufferers to make sense of their experiences, and 
to find aspects of them transforming (see Frank 
1997; Littlewood and Lipsedge 1997, 77; Durà-
Vilà and Dein 2009, 556). In so doing, it brings 
meaning and value to experiences in a way that 
purely biomedical approaches cannot, including 
experiences of mental distress in which there is 
little chance of recovery. For example, someone 
who experiences their depression as a dark night 
of the soul—an indication of their closeness to 
God that will eventually bring them closer still—is 
likely to have a greater sense of the meaning of 
their experience, which may in turn be a source of 
healing and therapy, than someone who believes 
their condition is purely a chemical imbalance. A 
person with psychosis who believes her experi-
ences are part of her divine mission, provided that 
her belief-influenced experiences bring her peace 
and joy rather than fear and anxiety, may find her 
psychotic experiences transformed into positive 
religious events rather than episodes marked by 
fear or uncertainty (see Murray and Taylor 2012). 
Notably, the meaning-giving aspect of religious 
interpretations of depression is shared by SI and 
PT accounts as well, although in the case of SI 
accounts the belief is more likely to imbue the 
experience with fear, anxiety and/or guilt than 
with peace and joy.3
This meaning-giving dimension is deeply rooted 
in SH theology and, because the meaning tends to 
be positive and brings a sense of peace and/or joy, 
seems to be a therapeutically valuable feature of it. 
However, a risk with SH theology is that the suf-
fering involved in mental illness is idealized or ro-
manticized. As Dan Hanson, whose son J(oel) has 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia and believes 
himself to have been Jesus in his past life, puts it:
People tell us that in another time and place J could 
have been a shaman or prophet. I am sure they are trying 
to make us feel better. But there are times when I resent 
their comments. What do these people know of mental 
illness, I ask myself. Have they lain awake all night 
wondering if their child will hurt himself or someone 
else?... Have they watched their child sit out in the snow 
for hours wearing only a light jacket, his arms stretched 
out to the heavens crying for aliens to come and rescue 
him from a hard, cold world that doesn’t recognize or 
appreciate him?... Have they helped lock up someone 
they love in a psychiatric ward? Have they had their 
hopes dashed by a system that is not equipped to deal 
with… their ill child? How dare these people trivialize 
what we got through by simply stating ‘he could have 
been a shaman’ as if conjuring up some spiritual role 
makes it all better. (Hanson 2004, 13–4)
As Hanson’s response highlights, an SH inter-
pretation can romanticize (and so blithely ignore 
the reality of) the suffering that goes on in the lives 
of people with mental illness and those who care 
for them. In so doing, it represents something that 
is in fact an evil (human suffering) as a quasi-good, 
and as not an evil at all. Furthermore, in associat-
ing psychological distress with closeness to God 
or being somehow spiritually elite (in Joel’s case, 
as shamanism, and, in Mother Teresa’s case, as 
indicating her closeness to God), this view may 
also hinder recovery by diminishing the person’s 
motivation to recover. It may cause them to wish 
to remain ill, so that they can remain spiritually 
special. This is significant in relation to the thera-
peutic value of the belief, since not wishing to be 
cured (at some level) can be an obstacle in the 
recovery process.
In addition, in viewing depression, hearing 
voices, and having visions as either pathological or 
spiritual experiences, SH theology tends to over-
look accounts that testify to the complementarity 
of medical and psychological treatments, on the 
one hand, and the spiritual and transformative 
elements of the experience, on the other (e.g., 
Jamison 1995; Slater 1998). It therefore does not 
pay due attention to the lived reality of depression 
for many people. It is also dangerous in discourag-
ing some religious people from taking ‘psychiatric’ 
medications that might help their condition, while, 
equally dangerously, dismissing the experiences of 
other sufferers as not religiously valuable.
Is it possible to hold on to the meaning-giving 
dimension of SH theology while jettisoning these 
negative characteristics? Here, I argue, we need to 
turn to PT theology.
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PT Theology
What Is PT Theology?
PT theology is the idea that depression is both 
inherently negative, and also PT (in terms of devel-
oping insight, compassion, appreciation of beauty, 
and other aspects of spiritual and psychological 
maturity). It can include (although it is not limited) 
to the idea of the ‘wounded healer’—the idea that 
the wounded person has unique healing capa-
bilities and/or even that woundedness provides 
characteristics necessary for the healing of others 
(“only the wounded physician heals”; Jung 1995, 
134; see Scrutton 2015). It is expressed by priest 
and psychologist Henri Nouwen who, looking 
back on the journal he kept during his depressive 
breakdown, wrote:
It certainly was a time of purification for me. My 
heart, ever questioning my goodness, value, and worth, 
has become anchored in a deeper love and thus less 
dependent on the praise and blame of those around 
me. It also has grown into a greater ability to give love 
without always expecting love in return…. What once 
seemed such a curse has become a blessing. All the 
agony that threatened to destroy my life now seems like 
the fertile ground for greater trust, stronger hope, and 
deeper love. (2009, 97–8)
Nouwen writes that his experience of depression 
was ‘fertile ground’ for a kind of spiritual and 
moral transformation, enabling him to love un-
conditionally, and freeing him from the tendency 
to overestimate the importance of others’ opinions 
of him. Nouwen’s depression seems to have been 
triggered by his struggle with his sexual identity 
(he was gay and had strong feelings for a male col-
league) and loneliness (as a Catholic priest, he was 
expected to be celibate). His biography also attests 
to the way in which his experience of depression 
enabled him to accept his sexuality, and inspired 
his later ministry with people with HIV/AIDS and 
his support of monogamous gay couples, in stark 
contrast with the homophobic views he expressed 
as a younger man (Ford 1999).
A very different example of a PT theology of 
depression was suggested to, and later adopted 
by, the Quaker writer and activist Parker Palmer. 
In his autobiography, Palmer relates being offered 
images by his therapist that became the guiding 
interpretation of his experience of depression and 
which Palmer says ‘helped me eventually reclaim 
my life’:
‘You seem to look upon depression as the hand of 
an enemy trying to crush you,’ [my therapist] said. 
‘Do you think you could see it instead as the hand of a 
friend, pressing you down to ground on which it is safe 
to stand?’ (Palmer 2000, 66)
When Palmer first heard these words they struck 
him as ‘impossibly romantic, even insulting.’ 
However, he also writes that, in the moment of 
scoffing at them he also felt that ‘something in me 
knew, … knew that down… was the direction of 
wholeness.’ In particular, he felt that his suffering 
had started prior to his depression because he had 
been living an ungrounded life, ‘at an altitude that 
was inherently unsafe’:
The problem with living at high altitude is simple: 
when we slip, as we always do, we have a long, long way 
to fall, and the landing may well kill us. The grace of 
being pressed down to the ground is also simple: when 
we slip and fall, it is usually not fatal, and we can get 
back up. (Palmer 2000, 66)
Palmer puts living at high altitude down to oper-
ating out of his head rather than his whole body, 
inflating his ego to ward off fears, embracing an 
ethic of ‘oughts’ rather than of genuine humanity, 
and accepting abstractions rather than seeking ex-
perience of God. He explains that he initially saw 
depression as an enemy because he had ignored 
the more sociable efforts of his interior life to get 
his attention. In fact, his interior life was not an 
enemy but a friend who, becoming increasingly 
frustrated, struck him with depression to get him 
to turn and ask simple questions about what he 
wanted. Once he had taken that difficult step, he 
began to get well (Palmer 2000, 68). Nouwen 
compares his depression with ‘fertile ground,’ and 
Palmer compares it to a ‘friend’—what is common 
to both is that (over time) both sufferers saw their 
depression as an occasion to grow or to become 
in some way better (mentally and spiritually) than 
they had previously been.
Differences Between SH and PT 
Theology
PT theology is like SH theology in some re-
spects, but they are also importantly different. 
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They are similar in that, in contrast with bio-
medical approaches to depression, they are both 
meaning-giving rather than problem-solving the-
ologies, and, in contrast with SI theologies, they 
give a positive rather than a negative meaning to 
experiences of depression. For these reasons, they 
both have therapeutic value.
PT theology is different from SH and SI theol-
ogy in that it does not put forward a supernatural 
etiology: the causes of depression are natural. 
Relatedly, less emphasis is put on the redemp-
tive power of the suffering itself, and more on its 
redemptive potential—particularly the potential 
inherent in the person’s response to it (Table 1). 
Consequently, suffering itself can be seen as un-
desirable and negative. Unlike SH theology, it is 
not the case that suffering is idealized.
An aspect of the fact that transformation relies 
heavily on the person’s response is that the experi-
ence is more likely to be or to become transfor-
mative if the person believes it is or may be trans-
formative—that is, if they themselves (implicitly 
or explicitly) adopt or are open to a PT theology 
(see Nouwen 2009, 96). This characteristic is 
particularly relevant to clinical contexts, because 
dismissing a religious person’s transformative 
view of their experience may encourage them to 
discard it in favor of a non–meaning-giving and 
purely biomedical model, and so reject a potential 
source of therapy. To downgrade a PT account of 
depression in a clinical context on the basis of its 
religious origin and content is to do the depres-
sion sufferer a grave disservice, for it is to deprive 
them of a potentially therapeutic interpretation of 
their experience.
A related distinction between PT and SH the-
ologies is that a PT theology presupposes that 
there is no difference in either origin or potential 
between mental distress that is spiritual and trans-
formative, and mental distress that is pathological. 
Rather, as Anton Boisen argued, the distinguish-
ing feature of these states “is not the presence or 
absence of the abnormal and erroneous, but the 
direction of change which may be taking place” 
(Boisen 1960, 135, n. 92). According to PT (in 
contrast with SH) theology, all mental distress is 
alike in origin (having a variety of ‘natural’ causes) 
and in potential (the realization of which is partly 
dependent on the person’s response). A particular 
case of mental distress may be defined as patho-
logical by a medical (or religious) authority, but 
whether it is or not does not determine whether 
it becomes transformative. This makes PT theol-
ogy more plausible than SH theology, because it 
recognizes that there are often no clear-cut and 
impassable boundaries between pathological ex-
perience and what may be or become conducive 
to spiritual growth.
PT Theology: The Causes of 
Depression
Among instances of PT theology, there is a 
general acceptance of ‘natural’ explanations for 
psychiatric disorders such as depression and 
schizophrenia, but no consensus about what their 
natural causes are. They may be biological or else 
social/environmental, or a combination of both. 
Some forms of PT theology do express the idea 
that mental illness—usually depression rather 
than schizophrenia—is a symptom of deep-rooted 
psychological or spiritual dissatisfaction or unful-
fillment. For example, Lee Stringer, who spent 12 
years as a homeless drug-addict in New York city, 
suggests this when he writes:
We, all of us, suffer some from the limits of living 
within the flesh. Our walk through this world is never 
entirely without that pain. It lurks in the still, quiet 
hours which we, in our constant busyness, steadfastly 
avoid. And it has occurred to me since that perhaps 
what we call depression isn’t really a disorder at all 
but, like physical pain, an alarm of sorts, alerting us 
that something is undoubtedly wrong; that perhaps it 
is time to stop, take time-out, take as long as it takes, 
and attend to the unaddressed business of filling our 
souls. (Stringer 2002, 112–3)
Notably, the idea that depression is an ‘alarm,’ 
alerting us to the need to ‘fill our souls,’ does not 
preclude the idea that the condition also has (at 
least partly) a physiological cause and/or cor-
relate. Nor does it suggest that taking physical 
treatments is necessarily a bad idea, because these 
may allow the person to function on a day-to-day 
basis—which, in some instances, may arguably be 
a prerequisite for transformation. What it does 
indicate is that, at least in some cases, regarding 
these physical treatments as a cure that gets rid 
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of the entirety of the problem is not the wisest 
way to approach the situation, just as it would 
be mistaken to think that taking ibuprofen to get 
rid of a headache is sufficient, if and when the 
headache is in fact the symptom of a more deep-
rooted problem.
Like SH theology, PT theology forms a correc-
tive to the biomedical approaches to depression 
that see the condition purely as a problem to be 
solved, and so eschew the meaning that can be 
found in it. However, it is also preferable to SH 
theology in several respects. It maintains that 
depression is inherently bad (in the sense of unde-
sirable), and refuses to idealize the suffering that 
accompanies it. It creates a middle ground that 
holds together the desire for a cure with the insight 
that the condition adds value or meaning to the 
person’s life or allows them to grow in some way.
Three Objections to PT Accounts
One objection that faces PT accounts is that 
it is possible that the retrospective nature of the 
accounts reduces their validity. In other words, it 
raises the question, do PT accounts reflect a ro-
mantic take on the experience of depression after 
the event? I think that this is not necessarily the 
case, because some writers speak of present, and 
even permanent, depression as transformative. 
For example, David Karp talks about how his 
realization that his depression is almost certainly 
permanent has caused him to move beyond a sim-
ply problem-solving approach to mental illness to 
a transformative and spiritual one:
The recognition that the pain of depression is un-
likely to disappear has provoked a redefinition of its 
meaning, a reordering of its place in my life. It has taken 
me more than two decades to abandon the medical lan-
guage of cure in favour of a more spiritual vocabulary 
of transformation. (Karp 2001, 148)
Table 1.
Spiritual Health Theology            Potentially Transformative Theology
Entails 
 The experience of some mental distress (i.e.,  The experience of mental distress (such as depres 
‘holy suffering’ or ‘spiritual dryness’) has a divine  sion, including spiritual dryness) has natural causes 
rather than a natural origin. (biological, social, etc.).
 The experience itself is salvific or transformative.  The experience is only potentially transformative. In 
particular, its transformative nature is partly depen-
dent on the person’s response.
 Spiritual and pathological experiences may  Experiences of mental distress may or may not be 
share some characteristics, but they are mutually  defined as ‘pathological’ by medical authorities. In 
exclusive. Genuinely pathological experiences do not  either case, they can become transformative. 
have the potential to become salvific or transformative. 
Lends itself to
 There is a qualitative difference between  There is no intrinsic qualitative difference between 
pathological and normal human experiences of mental  ‘pathological’ and ‘normal.’ The experiences of de 
distress (as well as there being a fundamental  pression, bipolar, schizophrenia are simply a variety 
difference between pathological and holy suffering). of the range of normal human experiences that can 
  lead to change, growth and development.
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Again, David Waldorf, an artist and long-term 
resident at Creedmoor State Hospital in New 
York whose diagnoses have included schizophre-
nia, depression, and bipolar disorder, says he 
would probably prefer to continue experiencing 
his condition rather than to forfeit the insights he 
has gained from it:
I think if an angel came up to me and said, “David, 
you can be healed of mental illness, but you’ll never 
again know the worth of life again like you did when 
you were ill,” I think I’d have to pick the mental illness. 
‘Cause that’s just how I feel, that it does show me a 
beautiful, enchanting side of life that I never saw before 
(Waldorf 1999, cited Greider 2007, 318)
Karp’s and Waldorf’s claims are significant be-
cause their conditions are ongoing and probably 
permanent: they are not the result of nostalgia 
about past suffering.
I have already noted that the belief that a trans-
formative experience of depression is more likely 
to occur in people who have a belief in (or at least 
openness to) the idea that their negative experi-
ence can be transformative. This raises a second 
objection: do people like Karp and Waldorf actu-
ally have a prior commitment to a transformative 
model that biases their assessment or gives them 
an agenda for falsely evaluating their experiences 
as they do? I think it would be difficult definitively 
to disprove this, but my sense is that there are 
sufficient people who genuinely do experience the 
condition as transformative and who are simply 
‘open’ to this possibility in advance (rather than 
having a strong commitment to the belief) to make 
this unlikely.
A third objection to a PT theology is that au-
tobiographical accounts such as Nouwen’s and 
Palmer’s may unconsciously produce a kind of 
spiritual elitism that may alienate people who 
experience their depression purely negatively 
rather than as an opportunity for growth. In 
other words, Nouwen and Palmer’s accounts are 
(according to this objection) tantamount to saying 
‘I have accomplished all of this during my experi-
ence of depression—so should you.’ This is a very 
serious objection for, if true, it would mean that 
a PT theology would not empower and edify the 
person who suffers from depression, but, rather, 
contribute further to their experience of debilita-
tion and loneliness. In short, if true, it renders PT 
theology destructive rather than therapeutic.
I think this is a genuine risk for the way in 
which a PT theology is often used, but I do not 
think it is essential to it. In the examples we have 
been considering, because Nouwen and Palmer 
speak only of their own experiences, they do not 
prescribe what others ought to experience. In 
recounting their own experiences, they suggest a 
hopeful possibility to others, without indicating 
that what they experienced is or ought to be or 
can be universal. To say that recounting their own 
experiences as transformative amounts to saying 
that that of others ought also to be is analogous 
to saying that the Life of Pi suggests that anyone 
stranded on a boat with a tiger ought to be able to 
survive. This is not the case because (as the respec-
tive authors are likely to recognize) people differ 
greatly—as do the boats in and tigers with which 
they find themselves. This objection does raise an 
important caveat for pastoral contexts, though: 
although it may be helpful to some to speak of one’s 
own experiences (as Nouwen and Palmer do), to 
preach to another about the transformative poten-
tial of their depression (or other form of suffering) 
is likely to be glib, insensitive, and even damaging 
(see Scrutton 2015). Notably, it is the preaching 
here that is problematic rather than a PT theology 
itself—and this is not particular to PT theology.
Summary
So far, I have outlined SH and PT theologies 
of depression. I have argued that both have an 
advantage over a purely biomedical model in 
encouraging people to find meaning in their expe-
riences, and over SI theology in promoting posi-
tive rather than negative meanings, and so have 
greater therapeutic value than these alternatives. 
I have argued that PT accounts are preferable to 
SH ones because they resist the temptation to turn 
depression into a good in disguise, and so do not 
idealize or romanticize the suffering involved in 
mental illness, or dissuade the sufferer from seek-
ing recovery from their condition. Relatedly, I have 
indicated that they are true to people’s experiences. 
Finally, I have responded to three criticisms of 
PT theology, introducing a pastoral caveat as a 
response to the third.
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Implications for Clinical 
Practice: A Critical Dialogue 
with Durà-Vilà and Dein
In an important 2009 article, two psychiatrists, 
Gloria Durà-Vilà and Simon Dein, make the valu-
able point that the attribution of meaning to the 
experience of psychological suffering is a crucial 
(therapeutic) element, and that psychiatrists may 
hold up or even prevent the attribution of meaning 
to take place (2009, 557) for instance, by enforcing 
a purely biomedical interpretation. Less helpfully 
in my view, they develop a distinction between 
salutary religious depression and pathological 
depression (Durà-Vilà and Dein 2009; see Font I 
Rodon 1999). The two have different symptoms 
(Table 2). The clinical implications of their view 
are that while pathological depression is the do-
main of psychiatry, salutary depression can be “a 
healthy expression of spiritual growth” (2009, 
545) and lies outside the domain of psychiatry. 
This seems to be a psychiatric form of an SH 
theology, in which the experience of depression 
is intrinsically religious and quite separate from 
pathological experience.
Is Durà-Vilà and Dein’s argument persuasive? 
Their conclusion seems questionable to me, be-
cause the symptoms of salutary depression as 
distinct from pathological depression (e.g., not 
ceasing to feel hope, and full or partial preserva-
tion of ‘apostolic’ activity) are more likely to be 
the consequences of adopting a positive meaning-
giving (SH or PT) account, and do not require us 
to posit a more fundamental qualitative difference 
between kinds of mental suffering.
Their view may also be counterproductive. One 
reason for this is that distinguishing between two 
forms of depression risks limiting the potential of 
depression diagnosed as ‘pathological’ to become 
transformative and therefore ‘salutary.’ This is 
particularly a risk among people who do not have 
the Catholic Christian theological structure, which 
would allow them to identify, and to have their 
condition identified as, a Dark Night of the Soul 
experience. PT theology addresses this problem by 
entailing that all depression and mental distress 
has the potential to be salutary—that is, to have 
meaning and be transformative—and does not 
exclude sufferers who do not recognize or conform 
to the Dark Night paradigm.
Moreover, Durà-Vilà and Dein conclude that it 
would be meaningless to consider the emotional 
distress of people with salutary depression as a dis-
ease, and that “telling them that their experience 
of the Dark Night is abnormal or pathological 
and offering a chemical disturbance in the brain 
as an etiological factor—so antidepressant medi-
cine may be taken—may deprive these religious 
people of the opportunity to give meaning to their 
experience” (2009, 557–8). Durà-Vilà and Dein 
are importantly right insofar as prescribing antide-
pressants as a panacea, and neglecting the spiritual 
and/or psychological dimensions of depression, is a 
dangerous tendency in medical treatment. But this 
seems to be true for all or at least most depression, 
whether or not it is religious in character. In imply-
ing that there is not a biological component in the 
depression of Dark Night soul sufferers,4 and that 
antidepressant drugs should not be given to certain 
religious people who interpret their experiences 
in transformative (or Dark Night), terms, Durà-
Vilà and Dein’s approach may prove dangerous in 
discouraging doctors from giving antidepressant 
drugs to religious people who need them to get 
through each day. They also overlook the many 
concrete examples of people who attest to the 
compatibility of psychotropic drugs and spiritual/
psychological growth (e.g., Jamison 1995; Slater 
1998). PT theology, in contrast, allows for the 
complementarity of seeing depression both as a 
negative experience calling for biological and/or 
psychological treatment, and as an opportunity 
for spiritual and psychological development, at 
one and the same time.
Durà-Vilà and Dein’s paper also highlights the 
ways in which exemplars of the SH model (such as 
Mother Teresa, Terese of Liseux, Paul of the Cross, 
and others)5 remained silent about their suffering, 
seeming cheerful to others. This fits with a wider 
perception of traditional Catholic views of suffer-
ing; for example, Sharon O’Brien, a professor of 
American cultures in Pennsylvania, articulates a 
similar view in the context of her perception and 
experience of Irish Catholicism:
[T]he religious and cultural ethic of Irish Catholicism 
stresses silent suffering. “Offer it up,” people used to 
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say about some tragedy or setback, which might, if 
endured well, grant you “a higher place in Heaven,” as 
if the hereafter were organized by the reverse of earthly 
values. If you’re Irish, suffering is supposed to make you 
a better person: you’re supposed to endure it, not seek 
help to deal with it. (O’Brien 2004, 159; see Orsi 2006)
The problem with encouraging people to suffer 
silently is that it may increase their sense of alien-
ation, while expressing suffering (in prudently 
sympathetic contexts) can bring relief and heal-
ing. Although silent suffering is not an essential 
element of SH theology, in seeing suffering as a 
form of spiritual heroism it certainly errs toward it, 
as O’Brien’s characterization of Irish Catholicism 
highlights (regardless of how accurate a descrip-
tion it is of Irish Catholicism).
Objections to my Argument
Two possible objections to my criticism of Dein 
and Durà-Vilà’s position ought to be addressed 
here. First, it could be pointed out that evidence 
suggests that, in most cases, antidepressants work 
primarily as placebos (Kirsch 2009).6 It is outside 
the scope of this paper to assess whether this claim 
is true, but let us suppose that it is in order to 
consider this objection to my argument. The idea 
that the effectiveness of antidepressants is largely 
placebo based is relevant to the clinical debate 
because someone holding Dein and Durà-Vilà’s 
position may respond to my argument by saying 
that there is no point prescribing antidepressants 
for religious sufferers, because they would not be 
effective in their cases (because they would not 
have a biomedical understanding of their condi-
tion, and so the placebo effect of the antidepres-
sants would be nullified). However, this argument 
only holds if the person unequivocally does not 
have a biomedical account of their condition. 
Many religious and spiritual people have a (wholly 
or partially) biomedical account of their condition 
and also a transformative understanding of it, 
with the first being concerned with the desire for 
a cure, and the second with a search for meaning. 
Although it may be problematic to force someone 
Table 2. Similarities and differences between “salutary” religious depression —the Dark Night of the Soul—and 
“pathological” religious depression, based on Font (1999, 100-8)
Similarities     Differences (Characteristic of the Dark Night of the Soul)
Passivity and slowness in action and speech  Healthy guiltiness that cases loving feeling to repair the 
evil cause
Negative self-evaluation Clear with to recover completely
Low mood, suffering loss of interests and  Does not run away from social interaction: community life 
satisfaction, sadness, disappointment, lack of  is well-maintained and interpersonal relationships and 
volition, feelings of emptiness, inhibition,  service attitude toward others improve. 
anhedonia, tearfulness and drying 
Somatic syndrome of depression: loss of appetite  Apostolic activity is not damaged, full activity sometimes 
with possible loss of weight, insomnia or  is preserved 
hypersomnia, tiredness, etc. 
Anxiety can accompany  Meaning: spiritual maturation as it is a process of con-
scious search of the love object (God) and of radical and 
progressive sacrifice of all that is narcissistic to become 
united with God
   Never ceases to feel hope 
Dein and Durà-Vilà (2009, 547). Reproduced by kind permission of Durà-Vilà. 
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(religious or otherwise) to take antidepressants, to 
withhold antidepressants from them or dissuade 
them from taking them may deprive them of a 
potential source of relief and so with the oppor-
tunity to reflect on their experience—something 
it is not always possible to do in the midst of 
despair. Therefore, the idea that the effectiveness 
of antidepressants is primarily owing to a placebo 
effect does not affect my argument.
A proponent of Durà-Vilà and Dein’s view 
might also object that curing a religious person 
from salutary depression would rob them of the 
opportunity for spiritual growth (see Durà-Vilà 
and Dein 2009, 557–8). To this, I would respond 
that the person would already have experienced 
mental distress through their depression, and 
that the memory of this will remain with them 
and that this is likely to be sufficient for their 
spiritual growth (e.g., a heightened appreciation 
of joy in God’s presence because of the memory of 
the feeling of divine absence; greater compassion 
for others who are mentally distressed). Indeed, 
although Karp and Waldorf attest to the possibil-
ity of transformation in the context of permanent 
depression, some people may be in an even better 
situation to grow spiritually once the depression 
has passed; it is notable that the Dark Night St 
John writes about was never intended to be a 
permanent condition, but a temporary part of a 
much longer spiritual journey.
Conclusion: Summary and 
Concluding Remarks
I have outlined and evaluated SH and PT the-
ologies of mental depression and argued in favor 
of PT theology. A PT account, I have argued, can 
allow people to hold the desire for a cure and the 
search for meaning in balance, and gives hope, 
ideally that the suffering will abate, but also that 
life can be meaningful even if it does not.
There are several clinical implications of this 
view. In common with Durà-Vilà and Dein, I think 
that certain religious and spiritual approaches 
have valuable resources for psychiatric practice, 
in terms of their ability to add meaning and the 
challenge they pose to purely biomedical models. 
Against their view, I think that we should not 
distinguish between pathological, and spiritual/
transformative/salutary, experience, and that psy-
chiatric treatments and spiritual and religious 
forms of meaning-giving, are compatible.
By way of concluding remarks, I would like to 
respond briefly to three thought-provoking ques-
tions I am often asked in connection to this topic: 
(i) whether a PT theology also applies to other 
forms of mental illness, (ii) whether a PT theology 
also applies to physical as well as mental illness, 
and (iii) whether (in a theistic context) the poten-
tial for growth in suffering justifies the existence of 
suffering (as suggested by soul-making theodicies).
First, does a PT theology also apply to other 
forms of mental illness? I would not want to ap-
ply a PT theology of depression unilaterally to 
all forms of mental illness, partly because mental 
illness is a constructed category rather than a 
natural kind, and there are significant dissimilari-
ties between depression and other forms of mental 
illness. Depression is a very different phenomenon 
from Alzheimer’s disease or substance abuse or 
paraphilia. That said, autobiographical accounts 
by Carl Jung, Anton Boisen, and others may 
indicate that a PT theology might be applicable 
to some instances of psychosis, and I would not 
want to exclude it from other forms of mental 
illness. What PT theology would look like in the 
context of psychosis or another form of mental 
illness would require a separate treatment to this 
discussion of depression.
Second, does a PT theology apply to physical, 
as well as mental, illness? This question highlights 
important questions about the concept of ‘mental 
illness’—for example, about medicalizing experi-
ences such as depression (by describing them as 
‘illnesses’), and about the underlying dualism 
implied by the distinction between ‘mental’ and 
‘physical.’ Because I have some misgivings about 
the term ‘mental illness’ (while also recognizing it 
to be useful in other respects and contexts), I do 
not think asking whether what is true of mental 
illness is also true of physical illness is the most 
helpful question. Rather, it is more helpful to 
ask whether what I have said about depression 
applies to other forms of suffering. The answer 
here is yes, to some forms of suffering, mutatis 
mutandis. People might be transformed by expe-
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riencing poverty in a way that means they develop 
compassion for others, or through a period of 
imprisonment that gives them time to reflect on 
their actions, or by a spell of illness that brings 
them face-to-face with the fact of their eventual 
mortality and highlights what is important to 
them. The ways in which these experiences can be 
transformative is likely to be different in each case. 
What is perhaps particularly interesting about the 
case of depression is that some of the writers we 
have discussed (e.g., Stringer, Palmer) speak of 
depression (or at least of their own depression) 
as being essentially teleological—as arising for 
the purpose of drawing attention to and rooting 
out undesirable or immature spiritual or mental 
characteristics (unfulfilment, being ungrounded, 
having an inflated ego).
This leads us naturally on to the third question 
about whether a PT theology can go beyond say-
ing that suffering is PT to providing an etiology of 
suffering in a theistic context—that is, to saying 
that God allows or even causes suffering (such as 
that experienced in severe depression) to enable 
us to grow morally and spiritually (often referred 
to as a soul-making theodicy; Hick 2007). The 
answer to this is that although a PT theology is 
compatible with a soul-making theodicy, it does 
not entail one. It is possible to hold that depression 
can be transformative and this is why God allows 
or causes depression. It is equally possible to reject 
the idea that the transformative potential explains 
why God would allow evil (perhaps because one 
finds the task of justifying extreme suffering mor-
ally or theologically repugnant) while holding 
that suffering can still be transformative. Here, 
the theist would move away from explaining the 
existence of evil to an emphasis on the ability and 
willingness of God to bring good out of evil.
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Notes
1. Some theologians and philosophers of religion 
draw a distinction between instances of suffering that 
can be transformative (or ‘soul-making’), and instances 
of ‘horrendous evil’ that can serve only to ‘dehumanize’ 
the person or diminish their flourishing and can serve 
no teleological purpose (see Adams 1999). This reflects 
a concern that to characterize the extreme suffering of 
(say) a Holocaust or gang rape victim as transformative 
or soul building may fail to recognize the severity of 
the suffering and the harm it has caused. Therefore, it 
may not always be the case that someone who adopts 
a PT theology of depression adopts a PT theology of 
all human suffering, and someone might even adopt a 
PT theology with respect to some, but not all, instances 
of depression.
2. It may be possible to romanticize the experience 
of milder suffering from within that experience. For 
instance, someone with a crush whose feelings are not 
reciprocated may romanticize their (very real but not ex-
treme) suffering in the chivalric tradition of unrequited 
love. This is far less likely to be true of more severe 
suffering—for example, the loss of a long-term partner 
or break-up of a more serious relationship. Other more 
extreme forms of suffering—say, being tortured, or 
being diagnosed with a painful and life-threatening ill-
ness, or experiencing long-term crippling poverty from 
which one can see no escape—are, I think, unlikely to 
be romanticized by the person experiencing them, even 
if milder forms of these experiences might be. The same 
might be said of a long experience of severe depression in 
contrast with a shorter and less intense period of ‘feeling 
blue.’ I am grateful to Ian Kidd for a helpful example 
that caused me to think further about this.
3. I  support this claim in  an article on SI theologies, 
which is forthcoming in this journal. 
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4. This is the strong version of their view, which I 
think is held by Simon Dein. In an email correspondence 
with him I asked, ‘Am I right in thinking that your view 
is that i) salutary depression is not biologically caused 
and ii) should not be biologically treated?,’ to which he 
replied: “You are right re Dark Night of Soul . Don’t 
feel it’s biological and does not require antidepressants” 
(March 9 and 10, 2012 [respectively], cited by Dein’s 
kind permission). A weaker claim is also possible, how-
ever; that we cannot know whether salutary depression 
is biologically caused or not, but that biological treat-
ment should not be given in these cases.
5. It is possible that these figures’ experiences could 
exemplify a PT rather than SH theology—much depends 
on how one interprets their writings.
6. Although Kirsch’s book has had a critical recep-
tion, it is increasingly recognized that antidepressants 
are often not effective and, when they are, are only 
marginally more effective than placebos. At the same 
time, there still seem to be some cases (usually of severe 
depression) where antidepressants seem to have a notice-
able positive impact.
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